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King v. Greene
No. 97-28, 1998 WL 183909 (4th Cir. 1998)1
I. Facts
On October 1, 1990, Danny Lee King was released on parole from impris-
onment for a prior offense.2 A week later, he and Becky Hodges King, with
whom he had entered into a bigamous marriage in January of 1989, stole a van
from a used car lot in Chesterfield County.3 They drove the van to the home of
King's mother in Christiansburg, where Becky had been staying during King's
imprisonment.4 On October 11, King and Becky drove the van to Kings Chase,
a residential area of Roanoke.' As they drove around, Becky wrote down the
names and telephone numbers of three real estate agents whose signs were
displayed on vacant houses.6 Carolyn Horton Rogers was one of the agents
whose name and telephone number Becky wrote down.7
Upon King's direction, Becky telephoned Ms. Rogers' office from a nearby
shopping center and told the person who answered that "[she and her husband]
wanted to see a house in Kings Chase."' When informed Ms. Rogers was not in,
Becky tried Ms. Rogers at home.9 Ms. Rogers left her home about 10:00 a.m. to
keep the appointment.' ° King and Becky met Ms. Rogers at the vacant house in
Kings Chase and introduced themselves as "Danny and Becky Keaton."'" Ms.
Rogers showed them through the house, and the three eventually reached the
basement. 2 There, Becky asked King for a cigarette. 3 He said he did not have
1. This is an unpublished opinion which is referenced in the "Table of Decisions Without
Reported Opinions" at 141 F.3d 1158 (4th Cir. 1998).
2. King v. Greene, No. 97-28 1998, WL 183909, at *2 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct.
4 (1998) (quoting King v. Commonwealth, 243 Va. 353, 416 S.E.2d 669, 670-671 (1992)).
3. King, 1998 WL 183909, at *2 (quoting King v. Commonwealth, 416 S.E.2d 669, 670-71
(1992)).
4. Id (quoting King, 416 S.E.2d at 670-71).
5. Id (quoting King, 416 S.E.2d at 670-71).
6. Id (quoting King, 416 S.E.2d at 670-71).
7. King, 1998 WL 183909, at *2 (quoting King v. Commonwealth, 416 S.E.2d 669, 670-71
(1992)).
8. Id (quoting Kng, 416 S.E.2d at 670-71).
9. Id (quoting ing, 416 S.E.2d at 670-71).
10. Id (quoting King, 416 S.E.2d at 670-71).
11. Kin, 1998 WL 183909, at *2 (quoting King v. Commonwealth, 416 S.E.2d 669, 674-75
(1992)).
12. Id (quoting King, 416 S.E.2d at 674-75).
13. Id (quoting King, 416 S.E.2d at 674-75).
CAPITAL DEFENSE JOURNAL
any and suggested she get one from their van. 4 Becky left and was gone "a few
minutes."' 5
What happened after Becky left was disclosed by the testimony of Vincent
Austin Lilley, an attorney appointed to represent Becky on her capital murder
charge.16 King apparently asked Ms. Rogers "some question... and at that point
he took his fist and hit her [on] the left side of her face."' 7 He continued striking
her and then choked her and threw her against the basement wall. 8 When she
started falling to the floor, he grabbed her-by the throat, "squeezed very, very
hard," and threw her to the floor. 9 Ms. Rogers was "semiconscious [and] moan-
ing" and he grabbed her at the waist.20 He then removed a knife from his boot
and thrust it "in an upward fashion ... into her chest and that was how he killed
her."'2' King then directed Becky to drive Ms. Rogers' car to a nearby shopping
mall and said he would be right behind her.' When King reached the mall, he
"wiped down" Ms. Rogers' car to remove any fingerprints.' After leaving the
mall in the van, King and Becky cashed checks forged on Ms. Rogers' account
and pawned a ring stolen from her.24 When Ms. Rogers did not return home or
appear at her office, her son and two of her co-workers began looking for her.'
After 5:00 p.m., one of the co-workers entered the vacant house Ms. Rogers had
agreed to show and found her body in the basement furnace room.26 Ms. Rogers'
car was later found at the mall.
Four days later, King and Becky were arrested in the stolen van in New
Philadelphia, Ohio.2" At the time of his arrest, King, of his own volition, told
Ohio police officers: "[Becky] doesn't know anything about this. I'm the one you
want."" This was to be the first of many instances of King's verbosity, and it
14. Id (quoting King, 416 S.E.2d at 674-75).
15. Kin, 1998 WL 183909, at *2 (quoting King v. Commonwealth, 416 S.E.2d 669, 674-75
(1992)).
16. Id (quoting King, 416 S.E.2d at 674-75).
17. Id at *3 (quoting King, 416 S.E.2d at 674-75).
18. Id (quoting King, 416 S.E.2d at 674-75).
19. King, 1998 WL 183909, at *3 (quoting King v. Commonwealth, 416 S.E.2d 669, 674-75
(1992)).
20. Id (quoting King, 416 S.E.2d at 674-75).
21. Id (quoting King, 416 S.E.2d at 674-75).
22. Id (quoting King, 416 S.E.2d at 674-75).
23. King, 1998 WL 183909, at *3. (quoting King v. Commonwealth, 416 S.E.2d 669,670-71
(1992)).
24. Id (quoting King, 416 S.E.2d at 670-71).
25. Id (quoting King, 416 S.E.2d at 670-71).
26. Id (quoting King, 416 S.E.2d at 670-71).
27. King, 1998 WL 183909, at *2 (quoting King v. Commonwealth, 416 S.E.2d 669, 670-71
(1992)).
28. Id (quoting King, 416 S.E.2d at 671).
29. Id (quoting King, 416 S.E.2d at 671).
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would lead to his execution. On November 2, 1990 King spoke with Vincent
Austin Lilley, Becky's attorney, on the telephone." After Lilley clearly told King
that he did not represent him, King nevertheless went on to explain "[t]his thing
with Becky is, insane... because [she] did not do what she's charged with.""
When Lilley pointed out that Becky had cashed Ms. Rogers' checks and that the
police had Becky "on file doing that," King said "she cashed checks because if
she wouldn't have, [King] would have broken her damn neck, or she believed
that., 32 King asked Lilley to visit him, saying that what he wanted to talk with
Lilley about "[was] the fact that [King was] the one that should be charged with
it."33 Lilley agreed, and on November 6 went to the correctional center for that
purpose.' , There, after signing a waiver in which he stated he understood that
Lilley represented Becky's interests and not King's, King told Lilley that he was
a member of "a Hell's Angels ... motorcycle gang" and that Ms. Rogers' killing
was a contract killing which had been set up before he was released from the
penitentiary.
s
The plan was to have Becky call Ms. Rogers to arrange the meeting at the
vacant house, but Becky was not to play any other role in the murder.36 When
Lilley asked King how he knew Becky "didn't kill Ms. Rogers, 37 King "took a
little piece of paper.., and he wrote... in capital letters I D-I- D... and.., he
said, I did."3 In a later meeting with Becky's attorneys King "just burst out, let's
cut the b- s __, I stabbed Carolyn Rogers to death. Becky had nothing to do
with it. Now, what do you want to know?"39
OnJune 14,1991, a jury convicted King of capital murder, robbery, and two
counts of forgery and uttering.' The jury recommended a term of life imprison-
ment plus 40 years for the noncapital offenses.4 1 During the penalty phase of the
capital proceeding, the jury found both future dangerousness and vileness
statutory aggravating factors and recommended a sentence of death. The trial
court adopted the jury's recommendation and imposed the death penalty for the
murder conviction.42 The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the convictions
30. Id (quoting King, 416 S.E.2d at 674).
31. King, 1998 WL 183909, at *2 (quoting King v. Commonwealth, 416 S.E.2d 669, 674
(1992)).
32. Id (quoting Kng, 416 S.E.2d at 675).
33. Id (quoting King, 416 S.E.2d at 675).
34. Id (quoting King, 416 S.E.2d at 675).
35. King, 1998 WL 183909, at *2 (quoting King v. Commonwealth, 416 S.E.2d 669, 674-75
(1992)).
36. Id at *3 (quoting King, 416 S.E.2d at 674-75).
37. Id (quoting King, 416 S.E.2d at 675).
38. Id (quoting King, 416 S.E.2d at 675).
39. King, 1998 WL 183909, at *3.
40. Id at *1.
41. Id
42. Id (citing VA.CODE § 19.2-264.4(c)).
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and the death sentence.4 3 King filed an amended petition for state post-convic-
tion relief with the Circuit Court for Roanoke County which was transferred to
the Supreme Court of Virginia' and dismissed.4"
Five days before King's scheduled execution date, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia stayed the execution pending King's
application for federal habeas relief.46 King's case was transferred to the Western
District of Virginia and his application for a writ of habeas corpus was denied.47
King then appealed to the United States Court ofAppeals for the Fourth Circuit.4"
Il. Holding
The Fourth Circuit rejected King's claims and affirmed the district court's
denial of relief.49
III. Anaysis/Application in Virginia
A. Admissibiliy of King's Numerous Statements5 °
The court's rulings on confessions are seldom discussed at length in the
Journalbecause the admissibility of a confession often turns on the facts peculiar
to a given case. New general principles of law are not often announced. The same
is true in King. A more complete discussion is included here for another reason.
This case illustrates the importance of developing a relationship of confidence
and trust between attorney and client, and the opportunity of achieving that with
some clients. King's insistence on talking was undoubtedly a major factor in his
conviction and sentence. Whether counsel could have persuaded him to shut up
will never be known. Some general rules for developing a good relationship
include: (1) visiting the client often, sometimes not even talking about the case;
(2) keeping the client informed and involved in the preparation of the defense
even if not all of his wishes will be followed; and (3) doing personal services for
the incarcerated client, such as carrying messages to family members. It may well
have been impossible to convince King that he should leave management of his
defense to a professional instead of trying to run the show himself. Hopefully
43. Kn,, 1998 WL 183909 at *1 (citing King v. Commonwealth, 416 S.E.2d 669 (1992).
44. The case was transferred pursuant to state law. See VA.CODE 5 8.01-654(c)(1).




49. Id at *1.
50. King first claimed the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of
1996, Pub.L. No. 104-132,110 Stat. 1214, was unconstitutional. King argued that the district court
erred in applying it to his case, that the AEDPA was unconstitutional as applied, and that the
district court misinterpreted it. The Fourth Circuit declined to review the decision because it found
that King had failed to raise any arguments that would provide a basis for habeas relief even under
pre-AEDPA standards. K'ng, 1998 WL 183909, at *3-4. (citing Satcher v. Pruett, 126 F.3d 561,567
n. 2 (4th Cir. 1997), cert denied, 118 S.Ct 595 (1997)).
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other clients can be persuaded of the folly of King's course of action. They can
only be persuaded, however, by counsel for whom they feel trust and confidence.
1. October Statements
King made his first statement to DetectiveJames Lavinder on October 16,
1990."' Lavinder spoke with King, who was detained at the Carroll County jail,
after he had traveled to Ohio with a warrant charging Becky with capital
murder.5 2 King was being held for violation of parole, and Lavinder advised
King of his Miranda v. Arizonas3 rights before the two spoke.' King reiterated his
denial of any involvement in Carolyn Rogers's death and their conversation
ended when King told Lavinder, "I think I better not say anything else until I talk
to an attorney."' King asserted that this constituted a request for counsel and
that because the Commonwealth failed to honor this request, every subsequent
statement he made to law enforcement officers was inadmissible.5 6
Two days after Lavinder and King's discussion, Detective Ken Kern spoke
with King in the basement of the Carroll County jail. 7 After again advising King
of his Miranda rights, Kern showed King items of clothing seized from the van.
Specifically, Kern singled out a shirt with a button missing; King stated that he
"had never seen it before and it wasn't his." 9 King argued this statement should
have been suppressed.' The Supreme Court of Virginia found both of these
claims procedurally defaulted61 and the Fourth Circuit affirmed on that ground.62
In addition, the court of appeals found that these claims would have failed on the
63merits.
2. November Statements
On November 1, 1990, Detectives Kern and Patrone went to the Powhatan
Correctional Center to execute a court order to take King's fingerprints and hair
and blood samples.' King was being held on parole violations (he had not yet
been charged in connection with Rogers' murder).65 After again being advised
51. Id at *4.
52. Id
53. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
54. Kin g, 1998 WL 183909, at *4.
55. Id
56. Id
57. Id at 5.
58. King, 1998 WL 183909, at *5.
59. Id
60. Id
61. Ide (citing King v. Commonwealth, 416 S.E.2d at 671).
62. King, 1998 WL 183909, at *4 -5 (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,728 (1991)).





of his Miranda rights, King volunteered to make a statement if he was provided
with an attorney, at a meeting with the police, a prosecutor, his attorney, Becky,
and Becky's attorney.66 The officers responded by telling King that because he
was not charged with any crimes related to Rogers' murder they "could not"
provide him an attorney; however, they also told him that he could retain an
attorney on his own. King made several statements while the officers collected
the samples. 7
On November 9, the officers transported King to Roanoke County jail to
take foot impressions and conduct a handwriting analysis.6 ' Before doing so,
Officer Patrone again informed King of his Miranda rights.6 9 While the police
took the samples, King told Kern, "[i]f you got questions, just ask me."" Kern
asked King about the murder. King denied killing Rogers, but made several other
incriminating statements." King then reiterated his desire to make a statement
before a prosecutor, Becky, Becky's lawyer, and counsel appointed for him. 2 The
officers then contacted an Assistant Commonwealth Attorney, who met with
King and told King that he was willing to listen.73 King acknowledged that he
might be "pulling the trigger" on himself by telling his story and then repeated
his earlier account.74
King maintained that under Edwards v. ArizonaW1 the statements he made on
November 1 and 9 should not have been admitted at trial because he requested
counsel on both occasions. The Supreme Court of Virginia rejected these argu-
ments.' In Edwards, the United States Supreme Court held that when an accused
has invoked his Miranda right to have counsel present during custodial interroga-
tion, all interrogation must cease until counsel is made available "unless the
accused himself initiates further communications, exchanges, or conversations
with the police."78 In Davis v. United States9 the court clarified that an Edwards
right can only be invoked by an "unambiguous[ ] request for counsel."'8 The




70. King, 1998 WL 183909, at *5.
71. Specifically, King. acknowledged being with Rogers and Becky in the house where the
murder occurred; claimed that a man named "Dude" had Rogers on the floor when he left the
house; and admitted he took Rogers' checks and jewelry. Id at *6.
72. Id at *6.
73. Id
74. King, 1998 WL 183909, at *6.
75. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
76. King, 1998 WL 183909, at *6 (citing Edwards v. Arizona 451 U.S. 477 (1981)).
77. Id at *6 (citing King v. Commonwealth, 416 S.E.2d at 360-62).
78. Id (citing Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85).
79. 512 U.S. 452 (1994).
80. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 461 (1994).
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Fourth Circuit rejected King's Edwards claim on the grounds that: (1) his requests
were not "unambiguous requests for counsel""1 ; (2) the November conversations
between King and the detectives were not interrogations for the purposes of
Miranda or Edward]2; and (3) King waived his Fifth Amendment rights because
he initiated the November 9 conversation by telling the police "[i]f you got
questions, just ask me." 3
King also argued that the officers misinformed him of his right to counsel
on November 1 when they told him that they could not provide him with
counsel before he was charged.'M The court declined to provide relief on the
grounds that: (1) his claim was procedurally barred because King never raised this
claim at trial, on direct appeal, or in his state habeas petition"5 ; and (2) that the
information was accurate, if incomplete, given his waiver.'M
Finally the court found that even if admission of King's October and
November statements to the police constituted error, that error would be
harmless.8 7 First, the court noted that in his October and November 1 state-
ments, King simply denied all involvement in the murder.8 8 Second, the court
pointed out that while King did link himself to the murder in his November 9
statements to the police, his statements to Becky's attorneys were still far more
damaging to his case.
B. Right to Confct Fre Counsel and to Proceed Pro Se
King contended he was denied the right to conflict-free counsel and to
proceed pr se in violation of the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
The court first noted that the claims were procedurally defaulted because King
failed to raise either on direct appeal or in his state habeas petition. It then
concluded that they also failed on the merits.8 9
81. King, 1998 WL 183909, at *6 (citing Davis v.United States, 512 U.S. 452, 455 (1994)).
82. Id (citing Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1979)). The Court noted that in King's
case, the detectives were executing court orders when they met with him, not attempting to elicit
an incriminating response.
83. Id (citing Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638,640-41 (1984)). The court of appeals also noted
that, in asking the police what was taking them so long "to drop warrants" on him on November
1, King may have initiated that conversation as well. Id
84. Id at *7.
85. King, 1998 WL 183909, at *7 (citing Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152 (1996))
86. Id
87. Id (citing Cooper v. Taylor, 103 F.3d 366, 370 (4th Cir.1996) (en banc)(holding that
admission of a defendant's lengthy, detailed, and tape-recorded confession was harmless, even
though that confession was recognized as determinative of the verdict by the trial judge and
provided most of the basis of the prosecutor's closing argument because of additional evidence in
the form of two short and poorly recollected prior confessions and certain circumstantial evi-
dence)(quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638, (1993))).
88. Id
89. King, 1998 WL 183909, at *8. (citing Gry, 518 U.S. 160-61).
1998]
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Under Fields v. Murra,90 "[a] defendant who desires to invoke his right to
self-representation, thereby waiving his right to counsel, must do so 'clearly and
unequivocally."' 9 The court found King failed to do so,92 and that even if he had,
he did not do so until the guilt phase of his trial and as such the decision of
whether to permit him to discharge counsel and to proceedpro se was within the
trial court's discretion. 3
The court also rejected King's conflict with counsel claim. Because King
conceded that counsel "had not presented the case in the manner that King
wished, to the point of directing King to perjure himself on the stand," the
Fourth Circuit concluded that King simply disagreed with his counsel's tactics.94
C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
King argued he was denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of
counsel. Under the standard articulated by the United States Supreme Court in
Strickland v. Washington" a petitioner must demonstrate that (a) the performance
of his trial counsel failed to meet an objective standard of reasonableness;96 and
(b) this failure resulted in prejudice. 7
1. Request for Counsel
King maintained that his trial counsel should have argued in his motion
to suppress that he requested counsel on October 16, rather than exclusively
asserting that King requested counsel on November 1.9 The Fourth Circuit
agreed with the district court's observation that his counsel's decision to focus
on the November 1 request was objectively reasonable because the October
statements did not damage his case.99 In addition, the court found that even if
counsel had erred, King could not demonstrate prejudice because (a) he did not
confess to any of the murders in those statements; and (b) given that King
initiated the November 9 conversation with the officers, the statements from
that date, which were much more incriminating, would have been admissible
90. 49 F.3d 1024 (4th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
91. Fields v. Murray, 49 F.3d 1024, 1029 (4th Cir. 1994)(en banc) (quoting United States v.
Reddeck, 22 F.3d 1504, 1510 (10th Cir.1994)).
92. King, 1998 WL 183909, at *9.
93. Id (citing Bassette v. Thompson, 915 F.2d 932,939-42 (4th Cir.1990) (finding criminal
defendant has no constitutional right to represent himself on appeal) & United States v. Gillis, 773
F.2d 549, 560 (4th Cir.1985)(same)).
94. Id at *9-10.
95. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
96. Id at 687.
97. Id.
98. King, 1998 WL 183909, at *10.
99. Id at *11.
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even if King's attorney had successfully argued that he had requested counsel on
October 16.'00
King next contended that his counsel erred in failing to argue that King
enjoyed an attorney-client relationship with Becky's counsel, Lilley, such that his
communications to Lilley were privileged. The Fourth Circuit found that King
was aware of the relationship and had waived any rights he might have had." 1 In
addition, the court concluded that King had a perfectly plausible reason for
contacting Lilley, other than a hypothetical mistaken belief that Lilley would
represent his interests, in seeking to protect his wife."°2 As such, the court
rejected this claim.0 3
2. Presentation of Evidence
King next argued that his counsel's representation was ineffective during the
penalty phase of the trial because counsel failed to develop mitigating evidence
concerning abuse King suffered during childhood and King's good behavior in
prison." 4 The court noted that King's counsel did present evidence of King's
abusive childhood and of his good behavior in prison. In addition, as to the
abuse, it found that whether or not counsel should have presented more exten-
100. Idat *10.
101. Id According to the Fourth Circuit, Becky's counsel informed King on several occasions
that they represented Becky, not King. In their first conversation, Lilley stated "I'm not your
lawyer." On November 6, 1990, King executed a waiver indicating King knew Lilley was acting
solely for Becky: "I understand that Vincent A. Lilley represents Becky Hodges King and that he
will protect her interests, and not mine." King signed the waiver after Lilley went over it word for
word with him. The two men then engaged in a conversation which lasted approximately two and
one-half hours during which King confessed to the murder.
The day after that conversation, King called Lilley again. Becky's other counsel,Jack Gregory,
also took part in this telephone conversation. Gregory first explained that he and Liley represented
Becky's interests only, and King acknowledged this. During the course of that conversation, King
asked Gregory and Lilley how he should deal with the media, and Lilley replied, "I don't represent
you. I represent Becky... And you've got to get your own lawyer to give you advice because I'm
not on the same side of this thing with you." Gregory supported this statement by remarking to
King, "[W]e're on opposite side of the fence," and encouraged King to get his own counsel. Later
in the conversation, King told Becky's attorneys:
I'm very well aware of y'alls major purpose in this thing. I am very well aware of the
fact in more ways than one we are on opposite sides of the fence because of the fact
that uh, y'alls main concern, if anything, would be to hang me if that would protect
Becky.
King also telephoned Lilley and Gregory on December 3, 1990. He told them that he understood
that they were acting solely as Becky's counsel, and they then arranged to meet on December 6. An
investigator accompanied Lilley and Gregory when they met with King at Buckingham Correctional
Center. At the outset of the meeting, King signed another waiver acknowledging that Lilley and
Gregory did not represent his interests. Id
102. King, 1998 WL 183909 at *11.
103. Id
104. Id at *12.
CAPITAL DEFENSE JOURNAL
sive evidence of the abuse King suffered as a child, not presenting such further
evidence did not prejudice King.' The court also concluded that there was no
reasonable probability that the outcome at sentencing would have been different
had such evidence been introduced. 6
King made several arguments that he was denied his due process rights and
effective assistance of counsel because evidence suggesting Becky was in fact the
murderer and King was not present at the scene was not introduced at trial.0 7
King contended that there was exculpatory evidence that would have supported
his theory that this was a "contract murder."'0 8 Specifically, King claimed that
his counsel failed to obtain a "package of materials" that exonerated him by
indicating that Becky killed Mrs. Rogers in an effort to settle a drug debt.0 9 The
court of appeals found that the record provided no support for this argument
and that the evidence contradicted King's assertions that Becky specifically
wanted to kill Mrs. Rogers."0 Furthermore the court found that the claim was
procedurally defaulted."'
King also maintained that his counsel "failed to develop and present
serological and forensic evidence showing that King was not in the presence of
the victim when she was killed."' 2 Specifically, King focused on the boots that
left footprints in blood at the scene of the crime and marks on Mrs. Roger's
head." 3 The court of appeals found that counsel's decision not to pursue further
inquiries or to challenge this evidence at trial was a reasonable tactical decision,
and clearly not one that was deficient."'
3. Constitutionality ofAggravating Factors
King also maintained that the aggravating factors considered in this
case --vileness and future dangerousness-- were unconstitutionallyvague and that
his counsel's failure to challenge the constitutionality of these factors constituted
105. Id (citing Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 324(1989)(noting that such evidence of abuse
may "indicate[ ] that there is a probability that he will be dangerous in the future") & Barnes v.
Thompson, 58 F.3d 971,980 (4th Cir.1994) (history of abuse may indicate future dangerousness)).
106. King, 1998 WL 183909, at *13 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691)).
107. id at *15.
108. Id
109. Id
110. King,, 1998 WL 183909, at *15. The Commonwealth presented evidence that several real
estate agencies received telephone calls from Becky seeking to have an agent show her a house. In
addition, the Commonwealth introduced a legal pad, found in King's van, which listed the names
of contact information of three real estate agents in the area. Id
111. Id (citing Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 160-61 (1996)).
112. Id King argued that his counsel only had this expert review the Commonwealth's
photographs of the evidence, and these photographs had been altered and did not possess a scale.
Thus, King maintained that his counsel did not have the expert examine the actual evidence. Id
113. Id
114. King, 1998 WL 183909, at*15.
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ineffective assistance of counsel.' The court rejected this argument, citing
precedent."6 Based on this precedent, the court found that counsel was not
deficient in failing to raise such a challenge.' 7
Defense counsel should not be discouraged from challenging the constitu-
tionality of both the vileness and future dangerousness aggravating factors. In
Godfrey v. Georgia"s the United States Supreme Court declared Georgia's vileness
factor unconstitutional. That factor is identical to Virginia's. The court held:
that if a State wishes to authorize capital punishment it has a constitutional
responsibility to tailor and apply its law in a manner that avoids the arbitrary
and capricious infliction of the death penalty. Part of a State's responsibility
in this regard is to define the crimes for which death may be the sentence in
a way that obviates "standardless [sentencing] discretion." It must channel the
sentencer's discretion by "clear and objective standards" that provide "spe-
cific and detailed guidance," and that "make rationally reviewable the process
for imposing a sentence of death." 9
Although the Fourth Circuit dismissed the claim, defense counsel should,
for several reasons, continue to argue that both the vileness and future danger-
ousness factors are unconstitutionally vague. First, doing so preserves the issue
in a defendant's case in the event the United States Supreme Court rules on it.
Second, it provides opportunity for lower courts to decide the issue based on the
high court's, as opposed to the Fourth Circuit's, interpretation of the Constitu-
tion.
D. Simmons Issue
King contended that the trial court violated his rights under the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments when it denied him the opportunity to rebut the state's
evidence as to his future dangerousness by presenting evidence that if he received
a life sentence he would not be eligible for parole for thirty years.2 In Simmons
v. South Carolina2' the United States Supreme Court held that when his future
dangerousness is at issue a capital defendant has a due process right under the
Fourteenth Amendment to provide evidence indicating his ineligibility for parole.
The Fourth Circuit denied the Simmons claim on this ground."z
First, the court observed that Simmons was a case in which the defendant
was ineligible for parole as a matter of law, and subsequent cases have limited
115. Id at*14.
116. Id (citing Bennett v. Angelone, 92 F.3d 1336, 1345 (4th Cir.1990) & Giarratano v.
Procunier, 891 F.2d 483, 489 (2d Cir.1989)).
117. Id
118. 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
119. Godfrey v. United States, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980) (citations ommitted).
120. King, 1998 WL 183909, at *14.
121. 512 U.S. 154 (1994).
122. King, 1998 WL 183909, at *14.
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Simmons to that realm." Because King did not maintain that he was ineligible
for parole as a matter of law, Simmons was inapplicable to him. 24 Second,
Simmons' ruling in 1994 announced a "new rule" of procedural constitutional
law.12 As the court explained in Teague v. Lane,126 a "new rule" is not to be applied
retroactively on habeas.
With regard to King's assertion of an Eighth Amendment 27 (rather than
Fourteenth Amendment) right, the district court correctly pointed out that the
Fourth Circuit recently held that to extend the Simmons rule to the Eighth
Amendment would be to create a "new rule."' 28 Although this position was
ultimately rejected by the Fourth Circuit, it is a sound claim and should continue
to be asserted. Also, should the United States Supreme Court decide the issue
at any time before end of the direct appeal process in a future case, Teague v.
Lane'" would not, of course, be a bar.
Douglas R. Banghart
123. Id (citing Ingram v. Zant, 26 F.3d 1047, 1054 n. 5 (11th Cir. 1994).
124. Id
125. Id (citingO'Dellv. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151 (1997)(holding that Simmons rule was anew
rule that could not be used to disturb habeas petitioner's death sentence).
126. 489 U.S. 288, 300-01 (1989).
127. The argument that regardless of whether future dangerousness is an issue at sentencing,
the Eighth Amendment entitles a defendant to a jury capable of a reasoned moral judgment about
whether death, rather than some lesser sentence, ought to be imposed was presented in Justices
Souter and Steven's concurring opinions in Simmons.
128. KinG 1998 WL 183909, at *14 (citing O'Dell v. Netherland, 95 F.3d 1214,1238 n. 13 (4th
Cir.), afid, 521 U.S. 151 (1997)).
129. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
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